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1 Introduction
Formal and informal networks are one of the real novelties of Information
Ages societies and economies. From an organizational viewpoint, they are con-
ceived as a new mode to organize economic exchanges, to take decisions and to
process information in environments in which exible and de-localized produc-
tion takes place and knowledge management and sharing deeply characterize
added value creation.
As well known, networks grant modular exibility, assets complemen-
tarity, multilateral communication and dynamically synergic behavior2 , funda-
mental traits of organizations that want to cope with Information Ages highly
dynamic and exible economic and social contexts. Moreover, ICT-based net-
works provide real-time connections among de-localized decisional bodies or
organizational units (Markus and Robey (1988), Lucas and Baroudi (1994)).
Hence, not surprisingly, academics, rmsexecutives and R&D agenciess boards
of directors have deeply discussed, during the last decade, under which condi-
tions networking is a protable organizational strategy (Radner (1992), Powell
(1990), Nohria and Eccles (1994)).
Among economists, such a debate can be framed in the literature on hi-
erarchies and polyarchies started by Simons (1976) seminal contributions and
on the research agenda during the 90ies because of an important paper by Sah
and Stiglitz (1986). In that contribution, Sah and Stigltz analyze whether to
concentrate or to distribute resources and control within organizations by com-
paring a hierarchy composed by two successive bureaus and a polyarchy dened
as two parallel decision nodes able to exchange information. Both organizations
assume decisions about projects implementation and Type I and Type II er-
rors can occur. In a hierarchy, decisions are centralized and approved projects
are those accepted by both bureaus. In opposition, in polyarchic organizations,
with decentralized control and resources, a project is implemented if and only if
it has been positively screened by at least one decisional unit. Sah and Stiglitz
to show that if we have poor (resp. rich) initial choice portfolio a hierarchical
(resp. polyarchic) organization minimizes Type II errors (resp. Type I errors)
and hence it is socially preferable.
Indeed, several renements of Sah and Stiglitz (1986)s model exist in
the literature3 . Nevertheless, so far, no contributions have tried to extend Sah
and Stiglitzs model to network structures. Thus, in this article, we deal with
such an extension to grasp some insights on the organizational issue: whence
2On networks as organizations see Van Alstyne (1997).
3For instance, Koh (1992) emphasizes that with variable evaluation costs screening ca-
pacities of hierarchies and polyarchies become respectively less and more e¤ective at higher
levels of complexity. Gersbach and Wehrspohn (1998) analyse relative performance of both
organizational architectures in presence of a budget constraint on resources for evaluation and
Ben-YaSahr and Nitzan (2001) study robustness of optimal organization architectures, i.e.
relative sensitivity of screening e¢ ciency to small changes organizationssize.
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networking ? In doing this, we rstly characterize the three organizational ar-
chitectures, then we build a Sah and Stiglitz-inspired set up where organizations
have N decisional units or bureaus. As it will be argued, in terms of screening ef-
ciency a network organization can perform better than a polyarchy in presence
of well-endowed choice portfolios and not too many decisional units. Otherwise.
the opposite result holds. Furthermore, consistently Sah and Stiglitzs results,
whether Type II errors are very likely to occur a hierarchy preforms better that
polyarchies and networks. As well argue, if we introduce a budget constraint
in the problem the same conclusions hold.
The remaining of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 2, deni-
tions and notation are introduced. In Section 3, basic results are presented and
discussed, while the case with a budget constraint is briey studied in Section
4. As usual, the last section concludes.
2 The Set-Up
Throughout this paragraph, we introduce denitions and notation.
Let us suppose to have N organizational identical units (decisional
nodes) and a set L of communication ows (links) among them. Communi-
cation takes place with no frictions and costs.
An organizational architecture is a triple of: a set of decisional nodes, a
set of linkages and an information di¤usion mechanism. Let us consider three
basic mechanisms: (a) an order relation among bureaus; (b) an homeostatic
di¤usion process among parallel polyarchic nodes and (c) a networked process
of many-to-many communication.
Accordingly to Sah and Stiglitzs (1986), each decisional node screens
randomly selected projects - with net value equal to x 2 R - from a feasibility
set (portfolio). Each node decides to implement or reject projects. The density
function of projects is given by g(x) and each unit is characterized by a screening
function, p(x) 2 [0; 1] ; that determines the probability of acceptance. In a hier-
archy, all projects are rstly evaluated by a lower bureau, then, only accepted
projects are re-examined by higher bureaus. Di¤erently, in a parallel polyarchy,
each node examines independently all projects and those rejected by a decisional
unit are re-examined by contiguous units. Finally, a network works like a pol-
yarchy with the exception that rejected projects are contextually re-examined
by all other network nodes4 .
More precisesly, a hierarchy is dened as H = hN ;L;i with lij 2
L only if i  j and @k such that i  k  j. Following Sah and Stiglitzs
analysis, the probability that a project is implemented by this system is given by
4Trivially, N > 3 othersiwe no di¤erences exist between a polyarchy and a network.
3
fH(N)(x) = [p(x)]
N and the number of expected implemented projects (overall
acceptance henceforth) is given by nH(N) =
R
fH(N)(x)g(x)dx:
Similarly, a parallel polyarchy is a triple P = hN ;L;Di where D is a
di¤usion mechanism of the kind:
D :=

lij 2 L only if d (x; y) = 1
lij =2 L otherwise (1)
where d is a distance measure. In this case, systems overall acceptance is
given by nP (N) =
R
fP (N)(x)g(x)dx with fP (N) = p (x)
"
1  (1  p (x))N+1
1  (1  p (x))
#
.
Finally, a network is dened as a triple  = hN ;L;V i with V := N 
N ! L and lij 2 L for 8i; j 2 N: Straightforwardly, networksoverall acceptance
is equal to n(N) =
R
f(N)(x)g(x)dx with f(N) = p (x)

1 +
1  p(x)
N   1

:
3 Comparative Performances
Let us proceed to the analysis of organizationscomparative performances
in the case of identical screening functions. Let us rstly refer to a benchmark
case with innitely many decisional nodes. In the next subsection, well deal
with a more traditional nite case.
3.1 Innitely Many Decision Units
With innitely many nodes, in order to rank above organizational architec-
tures in terms of performances, we have to compare limit properties of fs(N)(x)
for s = H;P; . More precisely, it can be shown that:
fP (N)(x) = p (x)

1 + (1  p(x)) + (1  p(x))2 + :::+ (1  p(x))N 1 =
N!1
=
N!1
p(x)

1 +
(1  p(x))
1  (1  p(x))

=
p (x)
1  (1  p(x)) = 1 (2)
fH(N)(x) = [p(x)]
N
=
N!1
0 (3)
f(N)(x) = p (x)

1 +
1  p(x)
N   1

=
N!1
p(x) (4)
Hence, we get:
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Proposition 1 With innitely many decision units, the following ranking holds:
nP > n > nH (5)
Proof. Straightforward using expressions (2), (3) and (4).
Intuitively, in a parallel polyarchy communication relies on one-to-the-
neightbours information ows and projects rejected by one unit (say k) are
thereafter screened by nodes q and r with d(k; q) = d(k; r) = 1 for 8k 2 N .
Then,.projects rejected by nodes q and r are analyzed again by contiguous nodes
di¤erent by k. Homeostatic di¤usion of information continues until a next-door
decision unit exists. With innitely many nodes very likely, sooner or later, a
decisional unit will accept a project previously rejected by many other nodes.
Let us call this e¤ect decisional redundancy. Thus, Type I errorsprobability
increases with N !1 and nP (1) = R g(x)dx! 1:
Exactly the opposite occurs in a hierarchy. With innitely many bureaus
each possibility must pass through innite checking. Reasonably, Type II errors
are null and very likely we shall have absolute inaction (i:e: nH(1) ! 0):
Finally, in a network many-to-many communication grants that those
projects rejected by a node (k) are simultaneously screened by all other nodes.
Hence, some of rejected projects will be chosen and remaining ones immediately
dropped since commonly known. This reduces the number of re-evalutations of
previously rejected items, decisional redundancy and overall acceptance with
respect to a parallel polyarchy
 
n(1) 2 [0; 1].
3.2 The Finite Case
Following what we have done above, we can now compare our organizational
architectures in the case of a nite number of decisional units. Using again (2),
(3) and (4) for N 2 R  3, we get:
Proposition 2 With N 2 R  3; the following ranking holds:
n > nP > nH (6)
Proof. For the rst part of (6), it can be shown that
p (x)

1 +
1  p(x)
N   1

> p (x)
"
1  (1  p (x))N+1
1  (1  p (x))
#
(7)
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because
1
p(x)
< 1 <
N
N   1 (8)
Hence, f(N)(x) > fP (N)(x) and n > nP : For the second part, we can
write
p (x)
"
1  (1  p (x))N+1
1  (1  p (x))
#
> [p(x)]
N (9)
Manipulating (9), we get:
1 > (1  p (x)
1
N (10)
Expression (10) is always veried given our assumption on p (x).
By comparing above results, we grasp some peculiarities of networked
communication. With a nite set of networks nodes, many-to-many informa-
tion ows make networks more receptive than polyarchies with homeostatic
information di¤usion. Hence, a stronger incidence of Type I errors can be easily
predicted. However, the likelihood of Type I errors is softened by increasing
networks dimensions. In such a case, lower decisional redundancy with re-
spect to parallel polyarchies, where information di¤usion is slow and iterated
re-examination of rejected items frequent, reduces the probability to accept bad
projects.
By joining previous propositionsinsights, it is also possible to under-
line that hierarchies are preferable to polyarchies and networks with awful initial
project portfolios, while, whether initial portfolios are very good ones, the op-
posite ranking holds. Furthermore, with excellent portfolios networks ensure a
larger portions of accepted and implemented good projects than a polyarchy
because of more e¤ective communication. However, the opposite is true with
innitely many nodes and excellent portfolios: in such a case, an innite pol-
yarchy is preferable than a network with innitely many nodes. Under this
proviso, decisional redundancy becomes a device to grant minimal Type I er-
rors as well as to avoid good projects rejection caused by myopic analysis or
distorted screening processes. In contrast, whether feasible projects are largely
of bad quality decisional redundancy augments more strongly Type I errors in
an innite polyarchy than in a similar network. In this case, the latter is better
than the former.
4 Two Types of Projects and a Budget Con-
straint
In previous sections, we have compared the three organization architecture
in terms of screening e¢ ciency in absence of any constraint. This is a meaningful
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comparison if we consider polyarchies or networks as principles of systemsorga-
nization (societies, communities, economies). Nevertheless, constraints matter if
we consider real world organizations. In particular, the economic literature has
emphasized the importance of budget constraints dened as a maximum num-
ber of acceptable projects (M) Thus, we now compare networks and polyarchies
performances in presence of a budget constraint5 ..
Following Gersbach and Wehrspohn (1998), we consider without loss of
generality the two projects case fwith N nite.
Let us suppose to have two types of projects (1; 2) characterized by
acceptance probabilities equal to p1 > p2 and net value given by z1 > z2: The
proportion of good projects in the portfolio is denoted by  2 [0; 1] and 1   
indicates the percentage of bad projects: As above, the number of accepted
projects for networks and parallel polyarchies are given respectively by nand
nP . Using (2) and (4), we can write budget constraints as follows:
M = nP (N)

p1

1  (1  p1)N+1
p1

+ p2

1  (1  p2)N+1
p2

(1  )

=
= nP (N)P (N) (11)
M = n

p1

N   p1
N   1

+ p2

N   p2
N   1

(1  )

= n(N)(N) (12)
Hence, following Sah and Stiglitz (1986), expected values of approved projects
for the two organizational architectures are respectively given by:
Y P (N) = nP
n
p1
h
1 (1 p1)N+1
1 (1 p1)
i
z1+ p2
h
1 (1 p2)N+1
1 (1 p2)
i
z2 (1  )
o
=
= nP (N)
P (N) (13)
Y (N) = n
n
p1

N p1
N 1

z1+ p2

N p2
N 1

z2 (1  )
o
=
= n(N)
(N) = n
(N)(N)
N 1 (14)
Substituting nP and nfrom (11) and (12) in (13) and (14), we get:
Y P (N)   Y (N) = M
N   1
"

P (N)(N   1)(N)   (N)P (N)
P (N)(N)
#
(15)
5Polyarchies and hierarchies are compared in Gersbach and Wehrspohn (1998).
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Then ,manipulating (15), we have the following:
Proposition 3 With only two kinds of projects (good and bad) and a budget
constraint, a polyarchy dominates a network architecture in terms of expected
value of approved projects if and only if:
N > eN = 1 + P

P
(16)
Proof. Immediate from (14).
Proposition 3s insights are consistent with our previous results. With
a nite number of decisional nodes and bad initial portfolios, the screening dis-
advantage of polyarchies is to reject more good projects than networks because
of less spread information ows. However, whether N is su¢ ciently large and in
presence of a budget constraint, this negative feature is compensated by stronger
decisional redundancy. This entails higher average quality and higher expected
value of accepted projects.
5 Discussion
In this note we have studied screening e¢ ciency of networks as organiza-
tional system by comparing them to polyarchies and hierarchies. Our results
point out that polyarchies perform better than network if there are innitely
many decisional nodes and well-endowed intial portfolios. In contrast, network-
ing is a preferable solution for organizations facing well-endowed projects port-
folios, but a limited number of decisional units. In this case, many-to-many in-
formation ows assure a better performance by reducing decisional redundancy.
However, with nite nodes and a budget constraint on acceptable projects,
within polyarchies this redundancy assures more accurate screening and better
quality approved projects as far as there are su¢ ciently many decisional units.
Some answers to our starting question - whence networking ? - can
be drawn. First of all, given good initial portfolios networking is a dominant
choice for organizations and systems with a xed or limited number of members
or basic units. By assuming a networked organizational architecture these sys-
tems can achieve stronger innovation and implement a larger fraction of good
projects. This, for instance, can be the case of research centres or open-source
communities where decisions pertain alternative innovations or improvements
and these are assumed by few technicians. In opposition, polyarchies are prefer-
able than networks for economic systems, like decentralized markets, where the
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number of potential decisional units is very large and economic endowments
constrain decisions. Finally, hierarchies are here conrmed to be optimal orga-
nizational architectures in correspondence to initial portfolios largely composed
by bad alternatives and hence high probability of Type II errors.
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